Touchdown before threshold, Airbus A330-300, Amsterdam Airport Schiphol

Combination of factors led to early landing

Several factors contributed to the early landing of the Airbus A330-300. Although runway 22 is long enough for a safe landing, the perception of a shorter runway can lead to an overestimation of the risk of an overshoot compared to an undershoot. Additionally, gusts of wind and a downdraft just before landing caused the aircraft to lose altitude. Finally, the glide path of the PAPI system resulted in a reduced safety margin over the runway threshold.

Integrated safety approach necessary

This incident underscores the importance of creating awareness and improving decision-making regarding runways for different types of aircraft. An integrated safety approach with comprehensive risk analyses, pilot training, and a systematic evaluation can contribute to this.

Recommendations

While Runway 22 at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol is structurally capable of accommodating the landing of an Airbus A330, the configuration of the instrument landing system (ILS) and precision approach path indicator (PAPI) system offers insufficient threshold crossing clearance for large and long aircraft. The ILS and PAPI do not meet ICAO and EASA standards for Eye-to-Wheel Height Category 4 aircraft. The minimum eye height over the threshold (MEHT) is published in the aeronautical information publication (AIP), giving operators the opportunity to assess whether the runway is suitable for landing with their aircraft. However, the continued use of the runway by Eye-to-Wheel Height Category 4 aircraft of other operators is evidence that the risk of crossing the runway threshold at a low altitude is not sufficiently mitigated.

The Dutch Safety Board therefore makes the following recommendation:

To Amsterdam Airport Schiphol:
Restrict the use of Runway 22 for Eye-to-Wheel Height Category 4 aircraft landings,
until adjustments have been made to ensure the minimum threshold clearance for
such aircraft can be achieved.