

APPENDIX A

RESPONSES RECEIVED ON DRAFT REPORT: 'FAILURE OF AILERON FLIGHT CONTROL CABLE

Reading guide: The fourth and fifth columns provide the literal text of the responses of the parties. The last column contains an explanation from the Dutch Safety Board of the way the responses were processed.

No.	Organisation	Section	Text to be corrected (first ... last word)	Argumentation for response	Adopted	Dutch Safety Board's response
1	Boeing	2.3.2	The flight controls are powered by redundant sources, 36 being either hydraulic system A or hydraulic system B. <u>The rudder system may also be powered by the standby hydraulic system.</u>	For clarity of the aircraft design description, the rudder has an additional available hydraulic power source.	Yes	Text has been amended accordingly.
2	Boeing	2.3.2	The trim electrically repositions the aileron feel and centering unit, which causes the control wheel to rotate and redefines the aileron neutral position. <u>back-drives the control wheels, causing them to rotate and redefine the aileron neutral position.</u>	We suggest the revised wording to clarify that the trim intended to back-drive the control wheel and change the neutral position.	Yes	Text has been reworded accordingly.
3	Boeing	2.3.2	When hydraulic pressure is available, the control wheel rotation input is transferred into a cable movement to the aileron feel and centering unit, see the schematic presented in Appendix B. This unit hydraulically drives both left and right cable systems to deflect each aileron. <u>The feel and centering unit drives the input rods that connect to the A and B system power control units. These two Power Control Unites (PCUs) hydraulically drive both the left and right wing cable systems to deflect each aileron</u>	Additional detail added to further explain the operation of the aileron system.	Yes	Text has been amended accordingly.
4	Boeing	4.0	Due to a failure of a cable of the left aileron of the left aileron control cable, the aircraft got into a degraded state of safety, as it lost a primary flight control as it partially lost a primary flight control causing a continuous roll effect to the left.	Suggested revised wording as only a portion of the roll control system was lost. The remaining aileron and spoilers continued to provide roll control despite the loss of control of the single aileron.	Yes	Text has been amended accordingly.
5	Corendon flight crew	2.1	It carried out the 'Jammed aileron checklist' which prescribed a flapsetting of fifteen degrees.	We discussed the "Jammed or restricted flight controls" checklist, but we concluded that it did not meet the conditions mentioned therein (controls were free and not restricted). So, we did not land with flaps 15 as written in the report. It was "just" a flap 30 landing.	Yes	Text has been ammended accordingly and FDR analysis confirms flaps 30 degrees position.
6	Corendon	2.5	The recording of the event (CVR) was not secured and subsequently overwritten and therefore not available for the investigation.	Initially CVR was secured according procedures operator. Released after approval Dutch Safety Board and thus subsequently overwritten.	Yes	Text has been amended accordingly.
7	Corendon	2.3.1	Since September 2017, the aircraft had been in use with the operator.	Since May 2012	Yes	Text has been amended accordingly.
8	Corendon	2.7.2	The pully closest to the position of the fracture was removed for investigation by the operator on request of the Dutch Safety Board	The pully was removed preventively by the operator and made available for Dutch Safety Board	Yes	Text has been amended accordingly.
9	EASA		None	EASA had no technical comments	Not applicable	Not applicable.

No.	Organisation	Section	Text to be corrected (first ... last word)	Argumentation for response	Adopted	Dutch Safety Board's response
10	Ministry of Transport & Watermanagement		None	Ministry of Transport & Watermanagement had not technical comments	Not applicable	Not applicable.
11	NTSB		None	NTSB had no technical comments	Not applicable	Not applicable.
12	ITSB		None	ITSB had no technical comments	Not applicable	Not applicable.