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Department

Dutch Safety Board (DSB)
Stephan Berndsen
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THE NETHERLANDS

MCO/DWA/SM1.2
Cologne, 26 November 2020

Subject: Safety recommendation related to the event to the BOEING - 777 registered VT-JEW, on 21/04/2017, at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport - Netherlands

Dear Mr Berndsen,

Please find enclosed the European Union Aviation Safety Agency's response with reference to the Safety Recommendation addressed to the Agency following the event mentioned above.

Yours sincerely,



Erick Ferrandez

Copy: Strategy & Safety Mangt - Strategy & Programmes (with support CT5 and FS2)
Certification Director
Flight Standards Director
Strategy & Safety Management Director

Subject: BOEING - 777 registered VT-JEW, on 21/04/2017, at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport - Netherlands

Reply to Safety Recommendation NETH-2020-001 received on 15/10/2020

<p>Safety Recommendation:</p>	<p>To European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration:</p> <p>To take the initiative in the development of specifications and, subsequently, develop requirements for an independent onboard system that detects gross input errors in the process of takeoff performance calculations and/or alerts the flight crew during takeoff of abnormal low accelerations for the actual aeroplane configuration as well as insufficient runway length available in case of intersection takeoffs. Take this initiative in close consult with the aviation industry, including manufacturers of commercial jetliners amongst which in any case The Boeing Company.</p>
<p>Intermediate response:</p>	<p>The safety issue “Entry of aircraft performance data” was included for the first time in the European Union Aviation Safety Agency’s (EASA’s) safety risk portfolio for commercial air transport fixed-wing (SRP CAT-FW) in the Annual Safety Review 2016.</p> <p>To mitigate the risks, EASA issued a Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) “Use of Erroneous Parameters at Take-off” to alert operators and flight crew to the safety issue and to recommend the implementation of operational mitigation measures (published in February 2016: https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2016-02).</p> <p>The effectiveness of the SIB 2016-02 was evaluated after Advisory Bodies - AB’s consultation on 25 Oct 2019 (EASA Advisory Bodies composed of competent authorities and industry), in the frame of the BIS (Best Intervention Strategy) on “Erroneous takeoff parameters”.</p> <p>The European Plan for Aviation Safety (EPAS) 2020 - 2024 - Appendix D - provides information on the BIS on “Erroneous take-off Parameters” planning, according to new priorities defined by EASA and the ABs.</p> <p>In accordance with it, the Agency developed a strategic approach to mitigate the residual risks associated to this safety issue by encompassing the following short, medium and more long term initiatives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Short term actions <p>The Agency has prepared dedicated Safety Promotion material to reinforce the messages from the SIB. In particular a video was published on the EASA Website (https://www.easa.europa.eu/erroneous-take-performance-data), where the lessons learned from previous safety investigations led by</p>

	<p>European investigation authorities are used to raise awareness on the risks associated to this safety issue; the video was further promoted in July 2020 with a blog article on the new EASA Together4Safety Air Ops Community Site (https://www.easa.europa.eu/community/topics/erroneous-data-parameters). Both of them were also shared with EASA’s collaborative partners, and a number of airlines have shared this material with their flight crews.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medium term initiatives The Agency will review the SIB 2016-02 in the light of the evaluation carried out, with special emphasis on a re-enforced use of the FDM, driving the attention of the operators towards the gathering and analysis of a dedicated list of precursors. • Long term plans The Agency intends to re-evaluate the feasibility of development of requirements for onboard system aimed to detect gross input errors, given the maturity evolution of some technical solutions. To do that an update version of the BIS is planned to undergo a new AB’s consultation in Q1-2021.
EASA Status:	Open