

**REPUBLIC OF TURKEY**  
**MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT**  
**Directorate General of Civil Aviation**

**DGCA:** B.11.1.SHG.0.14.02.00/ 703  
**SUBJ. :** Publication Report, TK-1951

18 January, 2011

Dutch Safety Board  
Anna van Saksenlaan 50  
2593 HT The Hague  
The Netherlands

Ref.: Your letter, OVV 10500689, dated May 06, 2010 and the Accident Report issued by the Dutch Safety Board.

Dear

First of all, I would like to thank you very much for your cooperation during the investigation phase of the accident, TK-1951, BOEING B737-800 airplane, registration TC-JGE, operated by Turkish Airlines during approach to Amsterdam Schiphol Airport on 25 February 2009, as well as forwarding the final report prepared by the DSB and requesting our comments on the Report according to the ICAO Annex 13 as the State of Registry, and the State of the Operator.

Please find enclosed herebelow our viewpoints regarding to your recommendation(s) to the Turkish side:

1. *"DGCA, ICAO, FAA and EASA should change their regulations in such a way that airlines and flying training organisations see to it that their recurrent training programmes include practicing recovery from stall situations on approach."*


All Turkish Boeing 737 Operators were mandated by the circular published in May 12, 2009 in order to update their training programmes and implementation of EASA SIB 2009-12 as well as revising the related part(s) of the Flight Crew Training Manual accordingly.

The Turkish DGCA was informed by the Turkish Operators that the necessary actions have been taken in line with the recommendations with the circular and SIB mentioned above.

We believe that the necessary action has been taken for this recommendation and we will continue to monitor the implementation of the training programmes during our audits.

2. *"FAA, EASA and DGCA should make (renewed) efforts to make airlines aware of the importance of reporting and ensure that reporting procedures are adhered to."*

In fact, this is an important tool for the Turkish DGCA for preventing the accidents and/or major incidents.



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All Turkish Operators, including Air Taxi, General Aviation etc., were mandated by the circular published in Oct. 26, 2007 in order to inform the Turkish DGCA regarding the reporting system.

We believe that the system is working without any major difficulties. The Turkish DGCA has received 120 reports in 2009, and 160 reports in 2010 under this mandate.

On the other hand, the Turkish DGCA has been monitoring the actions taken by the Turkish Airlines (THY) regarding the recommendation addressed to THY in the Report which is "*In light of the deficiencies uncovered in this investigation, Turkish Airlines should adjust its safety programme.*"

Please find enclosed herewith the list of the actions taken by the Turkish Airlines following the accident which has been recently forwarded to Our Office upon our request.

Under these circumstances, I kindly invite DSB to take our actions into consideration in order to close the safety recommendations addressed to the Turkish Side.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you very much for your kind co-operation and efforts for the contributions to promote the safety level of the Turkish Aviation, and I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Yours sincerely,

Accredited Representative  
Deputy Director General

Encl.: THY Action List

**ACTIONS TAKEN BY THY FOLLOWING RELEASE OF DSB REPORT**

The actions taken following the accident and the preliminary report were previously stated as follows:

1. A bulletin of caution issued for the Boeing Fleet after technical information was received from the Boeing Company.
2. A bulletin to all Boeing pilots after receipt of Engineering Bulletin MOM-09-0097-01B from the Boeing Company.
3. A Flight Safety Bulletin was published to raise awareness in situations similar to that of TK 1951 AMS.
4. A revision of the fasten seatbelt sign operation, to increase flight safety was implemented.
5. A bulletin on stabilized approaches was published.
6. An advisory circular was published to help reduce and eliminate rate of unstabilized approaches.
7. Criteria were established for unstabilized approaches into specific airports.
8. In order to expedite information distribution and access, an online reporting system was implemented.
9. Tri-monthly Flight Safety meetings with upper management have been increased to a monthly frequency for better results.
10. The study by the Flight Safety Division concerning associated risks has been expedited, and a system to notify pilots of respective risks has been implemented.
11. An extra simulator session has been added to the syllabus, totaling two days, to the second 6th month period of recurrent training in order to improve on any inadequacies and discrepancies.

During the investigation process, with regards to external and independent audit results, it was shown and confirmed that THY had a safety system in compliance with standards and recommended practices. Nevertheless, the final report included two recommendations with different scopes. The particular recommendation concerned ensuring an awareness in the frontline personnel about importance of reporting whereas the general recommendation concerned improvement of the safety system. In this context, the actions taken with regards to the in-company analysis to identify improvement opportunities and recommendations included in the final report are as follows:

1. The procedures concerning the identification of hazards and associated safety performance indicators were improved.
2. Line Operation Safety Audits are implemented and the results are analysed to define improvement opportunities and proactive measures.
3. Active control approach with regards to the data is adopted and feedback to the personnel is provided.
4. The stall recovery procedure was improved.



5. The crews are trained with regards to the new procedure within additional simulator sessions.
6. Normal recurrent syllabus is revised to include low level stall recovery training and supplementary documentation is provided to the crews.
7. The criteria for stabilization height is specified to be 1000 feet for both IFR and VFR flights excluding the circling approaches.
8. Before Landing Checklist is revised to include crosscheck of radio altimeters and a call-out concerning stabilization at 1000 feet.
9. Personnel selection and qualification processes are revised to include DLR testing for pilots.
10. Training and motivation meetings with a special emphasis on importance of reporting are organized to nurture the safety culture.
11. Communication means to exchange information are improved.
12. Safety meetings agenda was revised to include weekly Safety Action Group meetings.
13. Cooperations with international safety organizations such as ISASI, Flight Safety Foundation, Eurocontrol, IATA-IRM, etc. are improved.
14. All of the above items are emphasized in recurrent safety trainings.
15. Pilot categorization criteria and safety pilot duties are revised.
16. Airport categories, LIFUS procedure and set of airports for LIFUS are revised.

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