



U.S. Department  
of Transportation  
**Federal Aviation  
Administration**

P INGEKOMEN: 17 JUNI 2011

JUN 09 2011

Investigator-In-Charge  
The Dutch Safety Board  
P.O. Box 95404  
2509 CK The Hague  
Netherlands

Dear

The Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention convened a Safety Recommendation Review Board to review the enclosed response to FAA Safety Recommendations 10.316 and 10.317. As a result, the Review Board has classified recommendations 10.316 and 10.317 as "Closed-Acceptable Action."

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Jeff Gorney, AVP-420, at (202) 267-8748.

Sincerely,

Manager, Management Services  
and Recommendations Division

Enclosure

cc: AFS-140 (Cupp)



# Federal Aviation Administration

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## Memorandum

Date: MAY 17 2011

To: Director of Accident Investigation and Prevention, AVP-1  
ATTN: Manager, Management Services and Recommendations Division,  
AVP-400

From: Air Transportation Division, AFS-200

Prepared by: AFS-290, with input from Ronald Rifenberg, AFS-202

Subject: Response to FAA Safety Recommendation 10.316; AVP-400 memo dated  
November 30, 2010

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The following is our response to FAA Safety Recommendation 10.316.

**FAA Safety Recommendation 10.316:** DGCA, ICAO, FAA and EASA should change their regulations in such a way that airlines and flying training organizations see to it that their recurrent training programmes include practicing recovery from stall situations on approach. .

**FAA Response:** This recommendation arose in response to a May 2010 report by the Dutch Safety Board (Board) following their investigation of a Turkish Airlines B737-800 crash during approach to Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam, Netherlands, on February 25, 2009. It recommended that "the Turkish Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) should change their regulations in such way that airlines and flying training organisations (*sic*) see to it that their recurrent training programmes (*sic*) include practicing recovery from stall situations on approach."

The FAA agrees and has complied with the Board's recommendation.

On January 12, 2009, the FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), designated 74 FR 1280, as part of the Administrator's Call to Action. Its primary purpose was to "establish new requirements ... to ensure that safety-critical training and evaluation is provided." This included requiring the use of Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) and "special hazard training" for aircrews, such as loss of control and controlled flight into terrain.

On May 11, 2011, the FAA published a Supplemental NPRM to address several key issues that were not addressed in the preceding NPRM. Two key features that pertain to this safety

recommendation are 1) addressing National Transportation Safety Board recommendations concerning crewmember training and 2) enhancing that training. The rule specifically addresses the need to “ensure that all flightcrew members receive ground training and flight training in the recognition and avoidance of stalls, and recovery from stall, and recognition and avoidance of upset of an aircraft, as well as the proper techniques to recover from upset.”

We would like to thank the Dutch Safety Board for their diligence in preparing this safety recommendation and for their continued interest in aviation safety.

AFS-200 believes that the intent of FAA Safety Recommendation 10.316 has been met and we plan no further action.



# Federal Aviation Administration

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## Memorandum

Date: MAY 17 2011

To: Director of Accident Investigation and Prevention, AVP-1  
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AVP-400

From: Air Transportation Division, AFS-200

Prepared by: AFS-290, with input from Ronald Rifenberg, AFS-202

Subject: Response to FAA Safety Recommendation 10.317; AVP-400 memo dated  
November 30, 2010

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The following is our response to FAA Safety Recommendation 10.317.

**FAA Safety Recommendation 10.317:** FAA, EASA and DGCA should make (renewed) efforts to make airlines aware of the importance of reporting and ensure that reporting procedures are adhered to.

**FAA Response:** This recommendation was submitted in response to a May 2010 report by the Dutch Safety Board (Board) following their investigation of a Turkish Airlines B737-800 crash during approach to Schiphol Airport, Amsterdam, Netherlands on February 25, 2009.

The Board noted that the crew was apparently unaware that critical automated aircraft systems (auto-throttles) referenced incorrect radio altimeter readings which caused them to act in an unexpected manner resulting in the crash and that the aircrew was not aware of similar problems which had occurred on the accident aircraft on the two previous days. The Board also noted that, despite a "long history" of similar problems, they were not reported due to the inability to replicate them on the ground. It concluded that "reports are essential to determine the urgency for realisation (*sic*) of solutions and by that for the proper performance of the system of safety within aviation."

It must be noted that "[N]o person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition" and that "[T]he pilot in command of a civil aircraft is responsible for determining whether that aircraft is in condition for safe flight. The pilot in command shall discontinue the flight when unairworthy mechanical, electrical, or structural conditions occur." (Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR section 91.7).

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) agrees that reporting flight instrument anomalies (whether or not they are capable of replication) is vital to ensure effective safety programs. Underreporting of such events necessarily results in inaccurate assessment of the risk which, in turn, reduces the level of safety. The FAA will consider publishing an Information for Operators to remind operators that aircrew reporting of instrument anomalies is essential to maintain the highest degree of safety.

AFS-200 believes that the intent of FAA Safety Recommendation 10.317 has been met and plans no further action.

We would like to thank the Dutch Safety Board for their diligence in preparing this safety recommendation and for their continued interest in aviation safety.

AFS-200 believes that the intent of FAA Safety Recommendation 10.317 has been met and we plan no further action.