

6 RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the outcome of its investigation, the Safety Board has issued the following recommendations.

Operational control of transport of dangerous goods by rail

1. *The railway companies responsible for the control of the run-into freight train (ProRail and DB Schenker):*
Organise the operational control of freight trains with dangerous goods in such a way that no operational decisions are taken that lead to an increase in known and managed safety risks.

Responsibility of chemical companies for the chain

- 2a. *The chemical companies involved as shippers of dangerous goods in the run-into freight train (SABIC, DSM and OCI):⁷¹*
Fulfil responsibility for the chain by demanding from railway undertakings that in the operational control of freight trains carrying dangerous goods, no risk-increasing decisions are taken. Include this in transport agreements and monitor compliance.
- 2b. *The sector organisations coordinating the action programme Safety First:⁷²*
Consider the transport of dangerous goods as part of the responsibility for the chain in the action programme Safety First. Ensure that all chemical companies acting as shippers in the transport of dangerous goods by rail fulfil recommendation 2a.

Technical measures for the transport of dangerous goods by rail

- 3a. *The State Secretary for Infrastructure and the Environment:*
Ensure the tightening up of international regulations for the transport of dangerous goods by rail (RID) in such a way that the following is adopted:
 - no dangerous goods may be contained in the final wagon of a train;
 - tank wagons for the transport of non-toxic dangerous goods should also be equipped with buffer overriding protection devices.
- 3b. *The State Secretary for Infrastructure and the Environment:*
In advance of the proposed change to the RID in 3a, reach agreement with shippers from the chemical industry and goods carriers to introduce these measures in the

⁷¹ The following were approached: SABIC Petrochemicals B.V., AnQore B.V. (previously DSM Acrylonitrile B.V.) and OCI Nitrogen B.V.

⁷² VNO-NCW, Association for the Netherlands Chemical Industry (VNCI), Association for the Netherlands Petroleum Industry (VNPI), Association of Traders in Chemical Product (VHCP) and the Association of Independent Tank Storage Companies (VOTOB).

Netherlands as quickly as possible. This could take place along the line of the already existing agreement on the 'hot-BLEVE-free' composition of freight trains.

Collision compatibility of passenger trains in relation to the transport of dangerous goods by rail

4. *The railway undertaking of the passenger train involved in the accident (NS Reizigers):* For all relevant types of passenger trains, assess the collision compatibility in respect of freight stock. Do not use train types with poor collision compatibility on routes designated for the transport of dangerous goods.⁷³

Recommendations 1, 2 and 4 - in accordance with the Dutch Safety Board Order⁷⁴ - will also be addressed to the Human Environment and Transport Inspectorate (ILT). ILT will monitor compliance with these recommendations by the organisations in question, and duly report to the Board. For the other recommendations (3a and 3b), in accordance with the same Order, the Board will be informed directly on compliance by the State Secretary for Infrastructure and the Environment. In both cases, a maximum reaction period of six months following publication of the report applies.

⁷³ This recommendation ties in with recommendation 6 in the report previously published by the Dutch Safety Board into the Train collision at Amsterdam Westerpark (available via www.safetyboard.nl).

⁷⁴ By Order of 26 November 2015 (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2015, 470), the Dutch Safety Board Order (in connection with further implementation of EU Directive 2004/49/EC) was duly revised.