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Международная
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Ref.: [REDACTED]

SEP 25 2014

Mr. [REDACTED]
Senior Project Manager/Investigator
(Aviation)
Dutch Safety Board
P.O. Box 95404
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The Netherlands

E-mail: [REDACTED]

Dear Mr. [REDACTED]

I wish to refer to your e-mail, dated 25 June 2014, informing ICAO of an accident involving a Boeing 737-800, registration EI-ENL, which occurred on 31 May 2013 at Eindhoven Airport, the Netherlands. The relevant Final Report contains a safety recommendation addressed to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) which recommends that ICAO "raise the recommended procedure in paragraph 8.9.3.6 (ICAO Document 4444 PANS-ATM) to intercept the published or nominated ILS glide path from below to a Standard. In the event that interception of the Glide Path from below is not adopted as a Standard, horizontal and vertical operating landing gate limits need to be added to prevent aircraft exposure to pitch-up upsets due to False Glide Slope Reversal".

ICAO has undertaken a study of the vertical requirements when aircraft are vectored to intercept the final approach track to a pilot-interpreted final approach aid. The Air Traffic Management Operations Panel (ATMOPSP) is currently reviewing the existing provisions in the PANS-ATM, as part of an existing work programme item: "Final approach aid vectoring". In the event changes are considered necessary, provisions would likely be applicable in November 2016.


It is however considered, at this stage, that elevating paragraph 8.9.3.6 to a Standard may not effectively accomplish the objectives envisioned, i.e. the elevation to a Standard would not reduce operational circumstances that can lead to aircraft interceptions of instrument landing system (ILS) glide paths from above.

Operational realities dictate that in some situations flight crews may choose to undertake interceptions of glide paths from above, to varying degrees, under well-managed and well-considered circumstances, taking due account of weather and other factors. It is submitted that to absolutely prohibit interceptions of glide paths from above, through application of an overly prescriptive Standard may disrupt today's dynamic operational environment and possibly introduce new safety risks, e.g. systematic go-arounds under all weather conditions by flight crews who find themselves, despite thorough planning, to be above the glide path upon interception of the final approach.

On the understanding that ICAO continues to have a key role in the mitigation of operational risks associated with interceptions of glide paths from above, ICAO will incorporate the comprehensive information and findings of the Dutch Safety Board (DSB) Report into the ICAO Runway Safety Programme with a view to the development and promulgation of awareness, guidelines and best practices for both flight crew and air traffic control (ATC).

I trust that the foregoing information meets the intent of the safety recommendation of the Netherlands DSB. Should you require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,



Nancy J. Graham
Director
Air Navigation Bureau

cc: Representative of Portugal on the Council of ICAO